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Abstract
We present an approach to systematically derive safety cases for automatically generated code from infor-
mation collected during a formal, Hoare-style safety certiﬁcation of the code. This safety case makes explicit
the formal and informal reasoning principles, and reveals the top-level assumptions and external dependen-
cies that must be taken into account; however, the evidence still comes from the formal safety proofs. It
uses a generic goal-based argument that is instantiated with respect to the certiﬁed safety property (i.e.,
safety claims) and the program. This will be combined with a complementary safety case that argues the
safety of the framework itself, in particular the correctness of the Hoare rules with respect to the safety
property and the trustworthiness of the certiﬁcation system and its individual components.
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1 Introduction
Model-based design and automated code generation have become popular, but sub-
stantial obstacles remain to their more widespread adoption in safety-critical do-
mains: since code generators are typically not qualiﬁed, there is no guarantee that
their output is safe, and consequently the generated code still needs to be fully tested
and certiﬁed. Here, formal methods such as formal software safety certiﬁcation [3]
can be used to demonstrate the required safety and integrity of the generated code,
providing formal proofs as explicit evidence or certiﬁcates for the assurance claims.
However, several problems remain. For automatically generated code it is particu-
larly diﬃcult to relate the proofs to the code; moreover, the proofs are the ﬁnal stage
of a complex process and typically contain many details. This complicates an intu-
itive understanding of the assurance claims provided by the proofs. The complexity
of the tools used can lead to unforeseen interactions and thus causes additional
concerns about the trustworthiness of the assurance claims. Hence, it is important
to make explicit which claims are actually proven, and on which assumptions and
reasoning principles both the claims and the proofs rest.
Here, we address this problem and present an approach currently under devel-
opment to systematically (and ultimately automatically) derive safety cases from
information collected during the formal certiﬁcation phase, in particular the con-
struction of the necessary logical annotations. The purpose of these safety cases is
to provide a “structured reading guide” for the program and the safety proofs that
will allow users to understand the safety claims without having to understand all
the technical details of the formal machinery. We use a generic, multi-tiered safety
case that is instantiated with respect to a given safety property and program. Its
upper tier simply instantiates the notion of safety and the formal deﬁnitions for the
given safety property while its two lower tiers argue the safety of the program as
governed by the property. The lower tiers are constructed individually to reﬂect
the program structure. This can be done systematically because their argument
structure directly follows the course the annotation construction takes through the
program. Our approach is thus independent of the given safety property and pro-
gram, and consequently also independent of the underlying code generator. These
three tiers together constitute a single safety case that justiﬁes the safety of the
program. This paper discusses the structure of this safety case. It will eventually
be complemented by an additional safety case that justiﬁes the trustworthiness of
the certiﬁcation tool and framework itself. This will argue the safety of the un-
derlying safety logic (the language semantics and the safety policy) with respect to
the safety property (i.e., safety claims), as well as other components such as the
theorem prover.
We believe that the combined safety case (i.e., for the program being certiﬁed,
as well as the safety logic and the certiﬁcation system) will clearly communicate the
safety claims, key safety requirements, and evidence required to trust the generated
code. We expect that this will alleviate distrust in code generators, which remains
a problem for their use in safety-critical applications.
This paper describes work still in progress. So far we have developed the overall
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structure of the generic program safety case and manually instantiated it for sev-
eral examples, using only information logged during annotation construction. We
expect that this process can be automated easily and that it will furthermore be
straightforward to integrate with existing tools to construct safety cases such as
Adelard’s ASCE tool [1].
2 Formal Software Safety Certiﬁcation
The purpose of software safety certiﬁcation is to demonstrate that a program meets
its high-level requirements and remains safe in the presence of known hazards. For-
mal software safety certiﬁcation uses formal techniques based on program logics to
show that the software does not violate certain conditions during its execution. A
safety property is an exact characterization of these conditions, based on the opera-
tional semantics of the programming language. Each safety property thus describes
a class of hazards. A safety policy is a set of Hoare rules designed to show that safe
programs satisfy the safety property of interest. In our framework, the rules are
formalized using the usual Hoare triples extended with a “shadow” environment
which records safety information related to the corresponding program variables,
and a safety predicate that is added to the computed veriﬁcation conditions (VCs)
[3]. However, here we focus on the information provided by constructing the an-
notations, and leave the details of constructing (i.e., applying the Hoare rules) and
proving (i.e., calling a theorem prover) the VCs to the complementary safety case.
Formal software safety certiﬁcation follows the same technical approach as pro-
gram veriﬁcation. A VC generator (VCG) traverses the code backwards and applies
the Hoare rules to produce VCs, starting with any requirements on output variables.
If all VCs are proven by an automated theorem prover (ATP), we can conclude that
the program is safe wrt. the safety property.
Our example below uses initialization safety but our framework can handle a
variety other safety properties including absence of out-of-bounds array accesses
[3]; we expect that other properties handled by proof-carrying code such as null
pointer dereferences [7] can be formalized easily. However, we are not restricted
to showing exception freedom but can also encode domain-speciﬁc properties such
as matrix symmetry or coordinate frame consistency (which requires signiﬁcant
proofs involving matrix algebra and functional correctness), whose violation will
not immediately cause a run-time exception but still renders the code unsafe.
3 Annotation Inference
In order to achieve a fully automated veriﬁcation, a program logic requires annota-
tions (i.e., pre- and post-conditions, and loop invariants) at key program locations.
The purpose of annotation inference [5,6] is to construct these annotations auto-
matically, by analyzing the program structure. In our case, the annotations must
formalize all pertinent information that is necessary for the ATP to prove that all
potentially unsafe locations are in fact safe. If the program is safe, this information
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will be established or “deﬁned” at some location (which we thus call a deﬁnition)
and maintained along all control-ﬂow paths to all the potentially unsafe locations,
where it is used. The idea of the annotation inference algorithm, therefore, is to
“get the information from deﬁnitions to uses”, i.e., to ﬁnd the endpoints of all such
generalized def -use-chains, to construct the formulae used in the annotations, and
to annotate the program along the paths.
The annotation inference algorithm itself is generic, and parametrized with re-
spect to a library of coding patterns that depend on the safety policy and the code
generator. The patterns characterize the notions of deﬁnitions and uses that are spe-
ciﬁc to the given safety property. For example, for initialization safety, deﬁnitions
correspond to variable initializations while uses are statements which read a vari-
able, whereas for array bounds safety, deﬁnitions are the array declarations (where
the shadow variables get their values from the declared bounds), while uses are
statements which access an array variable. The inferred annotations are thus highly
dependent on the actual program and the properties being proven. For example, for
the initialization property, an invariant on a for-loop might express that an array
has been initialized up to the loop index (∀j ≤ i ·Ainit[j]). The VCG will turn this
annotation into three VCs, corresponding to establishing the invariant on loop entry,
preservation of the invariant by the loop body, and implication by the “exit form”
of the invariant (over the loop bounds) of the loop post-condition. For other safety
properties, the annotations can be seen as encapsulating the safety requirements
directly. In the case of the symmetry policy, a postcondition ∀i, j ·M [i, j] = M [j, i]
expresses the symmetry of M . Again, this will be converted into VCs and checked
by the prover. However, it is the def -use-dependencies, rather than the annotations
or the VCs, which govern the overall structure of both the safety argument and the
safety case.
4 Deriving Safety Cases via Annotation Inference
In our work, we consider each violation of the given safety property as a hazard.
To demonstrate that this hazard can not lead to a system failure, we construct a
safety case that argues that the safety property is in fact not violated and thus
that the risk associated with this hazard is controlled or mitigated. Safety cases are
structured arguments, supported by a body of evidence, that provide a convincing
and valid case that a system is acceptably safe for a given application in a given
operating environment [2]. In our case, the high-level structure of this argument
is constructed from information collected by the annotation inference algorithm.
However, the evidence still comes from the formal safety proofs. The safety case
only makes explicit the formal and informal reasoning principles, and reveals the
top-level assumptions and external dependencies that must be taken into account.
It can thus be thought of as “structured reading guide” for the safety proofs.
Here, we provide a simpliﬁed overview of this safety case. We concentrate on
its generic structure and describe its diﬀerent tiers. We further concentrate on
the program itself, leaving the remaining elements (i.e., the formal framework, the
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Fig. 1. Tier I of Derived Safety Case: Explaining the Safety Notion
certiﬁcation system and its individual components, and the safety proofs) of the
combined safety case for future work.
4.1 Tier I: Explaining the Safety Notion
Figure 1 shows the goal structure for the top tier of the safety case. It starts with the
top-level safety goal (i.e., the safety of the generated code with respect to the safety
property of interest) and shows how this is achieved by a formal argument based on
the partial correctness of the generated code. The argument stresses the meaning
of the Hoare-style framework, specialized to the given safety property. However,
the argument structure remains independent of the property. It uses contexts to
explain the informal interpretation of key notions like “safe” and “safety property”
and constraints to outline limitations of the approach, in particular the fact the
certiﬁcation works on an intermediate representation of the source code and only
shows a single property. Hyperlinks refer to additional evidence in the form of
documents containing, for example, the model from which the source code has been
generated.
The key strategy at this tier and its model (i.e., a Hoare-style partial correctness
proof using the dedicated proof rules of the init-before-use safety policy) as well as
its limitations (i.e., no termination proof) are made explicit. The strategy reduces
showing the safety of the whole program to showing the safety of all read accesses,
which emerges as ﬁrst subgoal. This is justiﬁed by the fact that the safety property
is deﬁned in terms of variable read accesses. The subgoal is further elaborated
by a model of the semantic safety deﬁnition, which exactly deﬁnes what is meant
by “safe”, using the notion of shadow variables given as context. The strategy’s
second subgoal is to show that the safety policy adequately represents the safety
property, which is also the foundation of the strategy’s original justiﬁcation (i.e.,
the claim that the proofs ensure the safe execution of the program). This subgoal
is not elaborated further in this safety case but leads to the complementary safety
case for the safety logic.
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4.2 Tier II: Arguing over the Variables
The second tier reduces the safety of all variables in two steps, ﬁrst to the safety
of each individual variable (justiﬁed by the fact that the safety property is deﬁned
on individual variables) and then to the safety of the individual occurrences. Note
that the number of subgoals of both strategies (see Figure 2 for the goal structure)
and the safety conditions are program-speciﬁc. This information is provided by the
annotation inference.
Both strategies are predicated on the assumption that they iterate over the
complete list of variables (resp. occurrences). Each individual occurrence then leads
to a subgoal to show that the computed safety condition is valid at the location of
the variable’s occurrence. This reduction to a formal proof obligation is justiﬁed by
the soundness and completeness of the safety policy; in addition, the speciﬁc form
of the safety condition is also justiﬁed.
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4.3 Tier III: Arguing over the Paths
The ﬁnal tier (see Figure 3 for the goal structure) argues the safety of each individual
variable access, using a strategy based on establishing and maintaining appropriate
invariants. This directly reﬂects the course the annotation inference has taken
through the code. The ﬁrst subgoal is thus to show that the variable safety is
established on all paths leading to the current location, using a formal argument
over all deﬁnition locations. Here, the model for the subgoal corresponds to the
pattern that was applied during annotation inference to identify the deﬁnition. Each
deﬁnition thus leads to a corresponding subgoal and then further to any number of
VCs, although here only a single VC emerges in both cases.
Goals that concern properties of the program (e.g., “xhatmin is deﬁned”) are
decomposed into subgoals that comprise program-independent tasks for the prover,
i.e., VCs. The validity of the construction of the VCs depends on the soundness of
the rules of the VCG, the simpliﬁer, and the deﬁnition of the safety policy, while
the correspondence to program locations is based on on tracing information added
by the VCG and retained during the certiﬁcation process. We have omitted these
details from the safety case.
The second subgoal of the top-level strategy is to show that the established
variable safety is maintained along all paths. This proceeds accordingly. The ﬁnal
subgoal is then to show that the variable safety implies the validity of the safety
condition. This can again lead to any number of VCs. If (and only if) all VCs
can be shown to hold, then the safety property holds for the entire program. The
evidence for the VCs is provided by the formal proofs; we plan to convert these into
safety cases as well.
5 Conclusions
Software development standards for safety-critical domains such as DO-178B [8] are
typically process-oriented and require that code generators are qualiﬁed for applica-
tion, often using an elaborate testing regime [9]. This time-consuming and expen-
sive process slows down generator development and application. We believe that
product-oriented assurance approaches are a viable alternative. Here, assurance is
not implied by the trust in the generator but follows from an explicitly constructed
argument for the generated code. We further believe that formal methods such as
formal software safety certiﬁcation can provide the highest level of assurance of the
code’s safety and integrity, and have described an approach whereby the inference of
annotations drives both formal safety proofs and the construction of a safety case.
However, the proofs by themselves are no panacea, and it is important to make
explicit which claims are actually proven, and on which assumptions and reasoning
principles both the claim and the proof rest. We believe that purely technical
solutions such as proof checking [11] fall short of the assurance provide by our
safety case, since they do not take into account the reasoning that goes into the
construction of the VCs. In fact, we consider the safety case only as a ﬁrst step
towards a fully-ﬂedged software certiﬁcate management system [4].
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We have described work still in progress. So far, we have developed the overall
structure of the generic program safety case and instantiated it manually. The
example shown here uses code generated by our AutoFilter system [10], but the
underlying annotation inference algorithm has also been applied to code generated
from Matlab models using Real-Time Workshop, and we expect that the same
derivation can be applied there as well. Current work involves constructing a more
comprehensive, combined safety case that covers the components of the certiﬁcation
system itself (i.e., the formal framework, the inference system and its individual
components, and the safety proofs). There we rely on the fact that trust in the
complex components of the system can be reduced to trust in simpler components.
For example, the use of proof checking mitigates the risk of the automated theorem
prover.
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